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In her target article, Jennifer McMahon argues that we understand art not by explicitly interpreting “raw 
percepts,” but rather by engaging with our implicit tendencies to interpret complex stimuli in terms of 
culturally-engrained preconceptions and narratives. These attributions of order require a shared conceptual and 
cultural background, and thus one might worry that in denying access to raw percepts, the view dulls art’s 
critical edge. Against this worry, McMahon argues that art can continue to create and innovate by inviting us 
to critically reflect upon the very preconceptions on which our engagement with it necessarily depends. In this 
commentary, I place these attributions of order in historical and empirical context. In addition, I discuss a 
lingering, related mystery — the possibility of the occasionally punctuated character of artistic evolution, in 
which prevailing aesthetic conventions are replaced with almost entirely new ones. I suggest that such radical 
breaks with the past are possible even given the concept-ladeness of perception, but are only likely to succeed 




In the classic Heider-Simmel demonstration (1944) — a foundational experiment in 
psychological research on social cognition — subjects watched a two-and-a-half minute 
animation depicting a stationary box and three moving geometric shapes: a large triangle, a 
small triangle, and a circle.1 During the animation, the large triangle enters from the left and 
moves to the right; subsequently, one of the box’s sides is divided in two and a smaller 
segment pivots outward, the large triangle then moving inside the box. Afterwards, the 
smaller segment pivots inwards and once again the box is whole. Then, the smaller triangle 
and the circle appear from the left and move near the part of the box that had pivoted, which 
pivots again. The larger triangle moves out of the box and comes near the smaller triangle, 
and they both shake for approximately five seconds, and… 
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Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the animation (which can be found with a cursory 
Internet search) is how excruciating it is to describe its contents in this manner. Let us 
instead use some terms favored by subjects in the experiment: A burly villain breaks into 
the home of two young lovers and is discovered by them after they return from an evening 
on the town. This hardened criminal is overcome by malice at the sight of the happiness and 
innocence of the startled young lovers; he vigorously beats the poor young man and traps 
the terrified woman in the house, cornering her with dark motives brewing in his evil, 
triangular mind. After recovering from his thrashing, the weakened young man opens the 
door and rescues his love and, after a brief but harrowing pursuit by the burglar, they flee to 
safety. 
 
In her article, McMahon argues that the sort of narrative attribution-of-order vividly 
demonstrated in the Heider-Simmel experiment is both endemic to human cognition and 
essential to artistic experience. Perception is conceptually and culturally loaded, but this 
embeddedness is actually a prerequisite, rather than a threat, to art’s ability to engage in 
cultural critique. She grounds this embeddedness in what she calls the principle of aesthetic 
form, the key idea being that art needs some “aesthetic syntax” in order to transmit a 
message — including in this category perhaps mundane symbolism such as that in Medieval 
European art holiness is indicated by the presence of floating golden halos, as well as more 
complex aesthetic conventions such as that in Cubism scenes are simultaneously depicted 
from multiple angles. However, she augments this principle with a corollary principle of art, 
which holds (echoing Kant and Adorno) that despite necessarily relying upon such syntactic 
conventions, the artist remains free to critically comment upon them and to suggest new 
ones. 
 
Two questions are raised by McMahon’s contribution that I will briefly address in this 
commentary. First, if attribution-of-order is ubiquitous in human cognition, what is 
distinctive about the sort of attribution-of-order that occurs during the appreciation of 
artworks? Attribution-of-order occurs any time we explain an event in terms of a causal 
principle or interpret the actions of another as goal-directed, yet we are not entering the 
artistic mode every time we e.g. watch an object roll downhill or infer that the dog wants to 
go outside because it paces near the door. We want a kind of architectonic of attributions-
of-order which would place all of these processes with respect to one another and show their 
dependencies. McMahon is rightly well-known for the sophisticated, empirically-grounded 
account of such processes offered in her latest book, but I briefly summarize empirical work 
in this area below for the purposes of context.2 Second, if art must make use of shared 
cultural background in order to communicate with a viewer, how are artists able to create 




fundamentally new techniques and conventions? Notably, art does not remain trapped in a 
particular cultural milieu that it gradually tweaks and modifies — Western art is not merely 
footnotes to Da Vinci — but rather engages in occasional dramatic paradigm shifts that 
deploy an almost wholly distinct “aesthetic syntax.” One might worry that while McMahon 
has opened up some room for innovation, affirming the culture-ladenness of perception still 
renders mysterious the occasionally punctuated character of artistic evolution. 
 
First, let us consider a taxonomy of attributions-of-order. The first cut in the taxonomy 
might concern the type of regularities perceived: are they of causal principles or the actions 
of intentional agents? While, if we be physicalists, agency will be just another more 
complex sort of causal principle, it is certainly a distinct form that requires distinct biases 
and responses. Another cut would involve the hierarchical level of the perception, for 
another important shift occurs when the principles of attribution-of-order are applied 
recursively to themselves. For example, an organism capable of recursive attribution-of-
order could begin to wonder about the status of its own perceptual apparatus, learning to 
confront cases of perceptual illusion and to compare the qualities of certain perceptions to 
those of others. And finally we might ask whether the predictions are generated implicitly or 
explicitly, for all of the principles discussed thus far can likely be mastered tacitly, through 
passive habituation — whereas explicit engagement of these capacities may introduce 
another degree of flexibility and control. 
 
Cognitive science has a great deal to contribute to this architectonic, as processes at every 
level of this scheme have been studied empirically. In particular, the idea that the mind 
consists of a hierarchical layering of attributions-of-order has recently been on the 
upswing.3 From this perspective, the brain can be characterized as a “prediction machine;” 
its goal is to quickly and efficiently predict the widest range of perceptual regularities across 
the widest range of situations. It lacks adequate space and processing power to simply 
memorize every statistical regularity in the environment, however, and so it must 
economize on representational resources. It accomplishes this trade-off by dividing the job 
into a multi-level, hierarchical process, where the task is broken down into layers, with each 
successive layer operating only on the output of the previous layer. Bi-directional inter-layer 
learning is governed by error-correction processes; when an important outcome is not 
predicted, the features that would have led to a correct prediction become more salient in 
the future. 
 
Over time, with enough learning (and perhaps some hardwired biases), the brain learns to 
organize raw perceptual experience into a fully-assembled, predictable world. Raw retinal 
input is broken down into features such as colors and locations, features are assembled into 
edges and boundaries, boundaries into shapes, shapes into figures, figures into scenes, and, 




eventually, scenes into narratives. This hierarchical process is governed by what 
neuroscientists call “convergence,” a progressive winnowing down and abstraction; at each 
stage, only part of the possible input is attended to, the part deemed important or diagnostic 
given an inductive crystallization from prior experience. Babies may begin with something 
like James’s “buzzing, blooming confusion,” but once the systems get set up, raw sensory 
input is progressively broken down into its most essential features and re-assembled into 
meaningful objects, scenes, and narratives (and as McMahon correctly notes, conscious 
awareness typically only comes in at the later stages of the process).4 At each step the 
system gains predictive power by focusing only on the most valid aspects; but at the same 
time efficiency comes at a cost, for the brain must ignore a large amount of potential 
information from the previous layer. Crucially, these views often predict top-down 
regulation of perception, where the features that are consciously perceived (with many 
actual details ignored and some entirely fabricated) are determined in part by the high-level 
narratives those features might support. 
 
On this scheme, perhaps McMahon’s distinctive mode of art appreciation consists in a 
recursive, explicit deployment of attributions-of-order simultaneously to an artwork and to 
the form of one’s own aesthetic experience. As McMahon suggests, artworks can place us 
into a mode of explicit reflection; we appreciate not only the structural features of the 
artwork, but also the effects these features induce in our sensory experience. And by 
triggering such a process of reflection, artists can critically comment upon our perceptual 
biases and cultural presuppositions. In short, art can point out how quickly we rush to 
conclusions, ask us why we find certain arrangements of features pleasing or jarring, and 
lead us to question whether we should experience those arrangements of features as such. 
And in so doing, art can teach us what we have gained through the bargain struck by the 
brain between prediction and economy — and perhaps even more interestingly, it can show 
us what we have lost. 
 
If McMahon is right, perception is necessarily culturally-laden, and it can reach us only by 
engaging our perceptual preconceptions and biases. But this raises the second question; if 
we cannot access a basic foundation of raw sensory experience, how are radical breaks in 
“aesthetic syntax” possible, as occurred in the transitions in painting from Romanticism to 
Expressionism or from Expressionism to Cubism? 
 
A suggested solution — consonant with McMahon’s own Neo-Kantian viewpoint — is to 
hold that there are indeed no “raw percepts” as such (at least, not available to 
consciousness), but at the same time there is a large stock of relatively hard-wired and 
culturally invariant perceptual tendencies and biases that artists can engage to develop new 
aesthetic conventions. This process can be viewed as a kind of aesthetic technology; such 




innovation typically requires a lengthy period of experimentation and false starts (viz. 
Picasso’s extensive collection of pre-Cubism sketches and drawings) before an artist hits 
upon a new aesthetic syntax that is both intelligible and flexible enough to ground a new 
aesthetic language. Not every new syntax will land on a “natural” foundation — a century 
later, symphony conductors still struggle to educate audiences in the aesthetic mysteries of 
Schoenberg — but in the absence of such dramatic paradigm shifts, artistic technique 
becomes stale and top-heavy with obscure references, losing its ability to place the viewer 
in the distinctively reflective state of aesthetic appreciation. 
 
I suggest that there is thus a tension common to art, one which perhaps explains its variable 
fortunes with the public. Unlike other communicative processes, in making art, artists 
constantly comment and innovate upon their distinctive communication channels, and to 
engage the audience must maintain a kind of equilibrium between boredom and surprise.5 
Wholly predictable art — art which only exemplifies prior conventions and expectations — 
can convey a narrative and meaningful aesthetic experience to an observer, but becomes 
boring and thereby loses its ability to induce reflection. Wholly unpredictable art — art 
which makes use of no prior shared conventions — is surprising but unintelligible. Thus the 
artist, if she wishes to be understood by the public, must constantly seek a cognitive balance 
between predictability and surprise. She can develop new languages — perhaps training 
viewers as she goes along, as does von Sturmer — but in so doing she would do well to 
exploit our shared core of hardwired perceptual endowments. 
 
Cognitive science can usefully contribute here also, for it is increasingly studying the 
developmental and evolutionary history of our attribution-of-order. These will include the 
aforementioned abilities to quickly master a variety of causal principles, but especially 
relevant are the numerous special capacities and biases that allow humans to understand 
each other and their social world. More so than any other animals, humans are built to 
detect other agents and respond appropriately to their actions, intentions, and mental states. 
These mechanisms include highly-attuned facial recognition and expression-emotion 
mapping, a suite of perceptual biases towards organic-seeming movement, an automated 
capacity for imitation and proprioceptive sense of others’ movements, and various 
capacities to track the eye-gaze of others. In a series of recent experiments, developmental 
psychologists have shown that babies as young ten months appear ready to spin scant 
perceptual evidence into rich narratives. Surian, Caldi, and Sperber (2007), for example, 
showed 13-month-old infants videos of a caterpillar inching its way towards either an apple 
or a piece of cheese; infants were surprised (operationalized in terms of longer looking 
times) when the caterpillar later preferred the other food item — but only when the 
caterpillar is apparently able to see the goal.6 Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom (2007) showed 10-
month-olds videos in which one shape would slowly climb up a hilltop, only to be “pushed” 




down by a second shape; when later offered a choice between shapes, the babies 
overwhelmingly preferred the “good guy” shape (and sometimes rewarded the “bad guy” 
with a hearty smack).7 
 
Putting aside the troubled divide between nativism and empiricism, for present purposes it 
is enough to note how remarkably sparse is the perceptual evidence to which the babies 
respond. These features provide an arsenal of basic components out of which artists can 
assemble new aesthetic languages. Notably, in most of the experiments on infants, the 
“actors” (shapes, caterpillars, puppets) are given “eyes” involving dark pupils on white 
sclera (humans notably being the only primates with white sclera). In conditions without 
such cues, the babies apparently did not interpret the objects as agents and thus did not 
demonstrate the experimental effects. Subtly cuing the same system, Modern artists like 
Miró can suggest agency with but two dots in a lighter field. Another oft-studied system is 
our specialized capacity for detecting faces; by merely arranging a scant bit of geometry 
face-wise, Picasso in his later period paintings and sculptures cued us to recognize his 
minimalist globular heads as fully-animated faces. And Heider-Simmel and in turn von 
Sturmer conjure simple shapes into vibrant actors by playing to our biases for organic-
seeming and emotion-indicating movement. 
 
A brilliant engagement with the form of our perceptual experience to convey a message can 
be found in Picasso’s Guernica. While the masterpiece is filled with ingenious devices to 
simultaneously invoke and frustrate our perceptual expectations, the most evocative touch, 
in my view, is the face of the fallen baby on the left-hand side of the canvas. The face is 
minimalist and relatively conventional, with one major exception — its limp, upside-down 
nose. This innovation produces a face at once both familiar and disturbing — we instantly 
recognize it as human, but are at the same time haunted by the unexpected realization that 
the nose, its most salient component, is entirely wrong. As a result, the face is difficult, 
almost painful, to survey. So much is conveyed on so many different levels with this one 
unexpected detail — that the baby is dead, that the death of one so young could not be 
expected and cannot be comprehended, and that war is horrible and unnatural. 
 
We are only beginning to understand the processes driving these reactions. Psychologist 
Eric Charles has recently called for the development of a “psychophysics” of social 
cognition by systematically varying the dimensions of movement in stimuli such as the 
Heider-Simmel animation, in order to determine precisely which aspects are actually 
causing viewers to attribute the various emotions and intentions.8 Von Sturmer is engaging 
in a similar form of experimentation through the various forms of movement and spatial 
relations explored in his installations. There is an interdisciplinary project here to discover 




why, when, and how we spin such rich narratives from such scant perceptual evidence — 
and perhaps also whether we should. 
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